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Indirect tax aggressiveness and tax reforms: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We study the incentives to engage in indirect tax aggressiveness and the implications of such 
actions for shareholder value. We take advantage of recent indirect tax reforms in India to design 
our study as a two-stage analysis of the antecedents and consequences of indirect tax 
aggressiveness. Our results suggest that size of the product portfolio, geographical proximity of 
manufacturing facilities to the headquarters, and the extent of international operations are 
associated with the propensity to avoid indirect taxes. Further, ownership concentration, 
membership in business groups, and financial health of the company also affect indirect tax 
aggressiveness. Firms involved in tax aggressive behavior suffer shareholder value loss when 
their privileged position comes under risk due to tax reforms, as suggested by the stock price 
reaction surrounding the tax legislation. Firms endowed with sufficient liquid resources and 
better-connected firms appear to be able to mitigate the negative consequences suffered by their 
tax aggressive peers. 
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Indirect tax aggressiveness and tax reforms: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment 
 
 
1.    Introduction 
Taxes play an important role in corporate decisions, affecting choices related to 
investments, financing, dividends, compensation, and restructuring activities. A large literature 
studies the motivations for and the consequences of aggressive tax planning (alternatively termed 
‘tax avoidance’ or ‘tax aggressiveness’ here) undertaken to reduce taxes. Many tax-planning 
strategies are legal and widely used, such as, taking advantage of allowable income tax 
deductions or structuring production and distribution operations to reduce indirect taxes such as 
excise and import duties. However, other strategies such as offshore tax sheltering or 
underreporting sales range from falling in the ‘grey area’ to being outright illegal. Although there 
are potential costs to tax aggressiveness including risks of monetary penalties, reputation loss 
and imprisonment, in certain cases tax aggressive strategies may have an expected net positive 
value to shareholders, prompting firms to engage in such activities. 
Prior studies examine the motivations for tax aggressiveness and its consequences for a 
range of stakeholders including managers, shareholders, creditors and the government. Empirical 
studies in this area face limitations due to the paucity of directly observable measures of tax 
aggressiveness as well as settings where a causal relation can be established between tax 
avoidance and its theorized consequences. We focus on tax aggressiveness with particular 
reference to indirect taxes. We exploit financial reporting requirements and data availability in 
India to construct a relatively cleaner empirical proxy for indirect tax aggressiveness and relate it 
to the firm’s operational and ownership characteristics. Indian public firms are required to 
disclose the amount of contingent tax liabilities that arise due to the firm adopting a different tax 
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position compared with the position undertaken by the tax assessing authority. Recent studies 
have used income tax contingent liabilities as a proxy for the degree of direct tax aggressiveness. 
We adapt the above measure for our setting and use the amount of sales tax contingent liabilities 
as our construct of indirect tax aggressiveness. The recent indirect tax reforms enacted in India, 
namely, the Goods and Services Tax (GST) Bill, offers us an opportunity to observe firm-level 
consequences of engaging in indirect tax aggressiveness. Due to acrimonious politics and debate 
surrounding the legislation, the passage of the Bill was far from certain and, therefore, firms did 
not have the opportunity to adapt to the new tax regime in anticipation of the legislation. 
Therefore, we treat the legislation as an exogenous shock to the system and use it to identify the 
relationship between indirect tax aggressiveness and the firm-level stock price reaction to the 
passage of the Bill. 
In the context of income taxes, tax aggressiveness is focused on lowering the firm’s 
income tax liability by reducing taxable income or taking advantage of other deductions and tax 
breaks. Direct taxes, however, are only a part of the firm’s overall tax exposure. Firms are also 
responsible for a variety of indirect taxes including sales tax, excise, and customs and import 
duties (in our sample, the average amount of indirect taxes is more than double the average 
amount of direct tax expense). In the case of many ad valorem taxes, such as the sales tax, firms 
collect such taxes from the end customer and pass these taxes on to appropriate taxing 
authorities. Sales taxes are not deducted as an expense in the firm’s income statement and, 
therefore, any potential savings of such indirect taxes does not directly affect the firm’s net 
income. However, indirect taxes raise the final price to the end consumer and shift the demand 
curve, adversely affecting the firm’s revenues and profitability. Indirect tax avoidance is quite 
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pervasive in many developed and developing economies.1 In extreme cases, firms do not register 
for VAT or underreport sales, allowing such firms to offer lower net prices to their customers (as 
well as save on income taxes on unreported income). While such strategies are a clear violation 
of tax laws and, therefore, likely to invite penalties and legal action, there is evidence that even 
in developed economies firms engage in such tax evasion. A more common situation is where 
firms seek to reduce the incidence of indirect taxes or delay the collection or pass-through of 
indirect taxes from the end customer. Even if the firm’s tax position is ultimately overturned, the 
firm is often only required to pay back taxes with a moderate interest or penalty. In the interim 
period, cash conserved through tax avoidance serves as a relatively cheap source of financing. In 
sum, firms can benefit from aggressive indirect tax planning, particularly when indirect tax laws 
are complicated and differences of opinion exist on the applicability of tax rules. 
We examine various incentives to engage in indirect tax aggressiveness. Using contingent 
tax liabilities arising from sales tax disputes with the government as an empirical proxy for 
indirect tax aggressiveness, we find that firms with greater product variety are more likely to 
avoid sales taxes. Also, firms with greater geographical concentration of their physical plant 
locations in the proximity of the headquarters, and those with a greater degree of domestic 
operations (as opposed to international operations), are likely to have greater disputed sales tax 
liabilities. The above results are consistent with features of the operational structure of certain 
firms allowing them greater opportunities for indirect tax avoidance. 
                                               
1 There is a large literature on tax evasion (see, e.g., Sandmo, 2005 for a review). In the specific context of indirect 
taxes, Marrelli (1984), Virmani (1989), Gordon (1990), Cremer and Gahvari (1999), and Besfamille, De Donder and 
Lozachmeur (2013) model tax evasion through unreported (cash) sales and other means, and the effect of such 
evasion on production efficiency and social welfare. Empirical studies, such as, Nam, Parsche, and Schaden (2001) 
and Keen and Smith (2007) document widespread noncompliance with Value Added Tax (VAT) rules, including tax 
evasion and fraud, in the European Union. Besfamille et al. (2013) also review noncompliance in Latin America. 
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Our results also suggest complementarity between direct and indirect tax aggressiveness. 
Specifically, we find that firms with higher levels of book-tax difference, a widely used 
empirical proxy for income tax avoidance, are also more likely to have contingent sales tax 
liabilities. Also, firms that pay their auditors for tax-related advice are more likely to engage in 
indirect tax aggressiveness. Collectively, the above findings suggest that firms incur significant 
expenditures to take advantage of tax-related expertise of their auditors which helps them avoid 
both direct and indirect taxes. 
We exploit features of the Indian business environment, which are also endemic to other 
emerging economies such as China and South Korea, to study how ownership concentration and 
systemic entrenchment influence the propensity to avoid indirect taxes. Specifically, we find that 
entrenched firms, as evidenced by higher promoter (controlling shareholder) ownership and firm 
affiliation with business groups, are more likely to engage in indirect tax aggressiveness. Finally, 
firms with relatively poorer financial health are more likely to avoid indirect taxes. 
Examining the factors behind indirect tax aggressiveness not only sheds light on this 
relatively unexplored area, but also helps us strengthen our identification strategy when it comes 
to examining the consequences of avoiding indirect taxes. In addition to designing an event study 
around an exogenous regulatory shock, we also develop a two-stage estimation strategy in the 
spirit of prior studies such as Alm, Blackwell and McKee (2004) to examine the relation between 
tax aggressiveness and its shareholder value effects.2 In August 2016, the Indian Parliament 
unexpectedly passed a Goods and Services Tax (GST) Bill that vastly simplified the previously 
complicated indirect tax regime. Since the tax reforms were largely unanticipated and affected all 
                                               
2 Alm et al. (2004) examine firms’ propensity to be selected for sales tax audits by the state sales tax authority. They use 
a two-stage model to first estimate the taxing authority’s audit selection rule, and then, conditional upon audit 
selection, the firm's sales tax compliance choice. 
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firms in India, the legislation can be treated as an exogenous shock to the economy, allowing us 
to design an event study using the cross-sectional variation in the firm-level stock price reaction 
to the reform. The GST Bill aims to replace a broad range of indirect taxes in India such as sales 
tax, excise, and other local and municipal taxes, with a single Goods and Services Tax (GST), 
that is supposed to be uniformly and consistently applied across various state and local tax 
jurisdictions. As a result of the above simplification of indirect tax rules, consumers are likely to 
benefit from avoiding the cascading effect of ‘tax-on-tax’ under the prior regime, and sellers are 
likely to benefit due to lower compliance costs. However, simplification of the tax rules could 
close loopholes previously exploited by tax aggressive firms to reduce their indirect tax burden. 
For such firms, the GST Bill could actually be bad news since the firms would not only be 
expected to pay outstanding back taxes but would also forego future opportunities to engage in 
indirect tax manipulation. Therefore, for tax aggressive firms the GST Bill acts as an external 
shock that jeopardizes the firm’s indirect tax-related rent seeking opportunities. 
We use the firm-level stock price reaction over a narrow time window surrounding the 
passage of the GST Bill as a proxy for the net effects of the tax reform on shareholder value. 
Consistent with our expectation, we find that firms with a greater degree of indirect tax 
aggressiveness experience more negative abnormal stock returns. This result is robust to 
alternative test specifications, such as a two-stage Heckman model and regression discontinuity 
design, thus allaying concerns over endogeneity and other econometric issues. As in the case of 
the determinants of disputed tax liabilities, we also use features of the Indian economy to 
examine how variations in the ease of doing business and the probability of tax law enforcement 
across jurisdictions affects investors’ assessment of the net effect of the reforms. Collectively, 
our evidence sheds light on the incentives for and consequences of indirect tax aggressiveness. 
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Indirect taxes have received relatively less attention compared with direct taxes, 
particularly with regards to tax avoidance. We contribute to the literature by using disputed 
(contingent) sales tax liabilities as an empirical proxy for indirect tax aggressiveness, and present 
evidence on the drivers of such behavior, such as the firm’s operational structure, tax avoidance 
synergies, ownership concentration and systemic entrenchment. Further, while there is prior 
evidence on the costs of tax aggressiveness, studies in this area face limitations due to the 
endogenous relationship between factors driving tax choices and shareholder wealth effects of 
the firm’s tax strategy. A significant and unexpected tax reform such as the GST Bill in India not 
only provides an econometrically robust setting to test the consequences of tax aggressiveness, 
but also allows us to exploit features of a prominent emerging market economy and provide 
insights on which types of firms lose when their rent seeking opportunities are taken away. 
 
2. Institutional Background and Prior Literature 
2.1  Indirect Tax Aggressiveness 
Tax aggressiveness is generally defined as an arrangement or scheme with the purpose of 
avoiding or reducing explicit taxes (see, e.g., Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 2008; Hanlon and 
Heitzmann, 2010). As noted in the prior literature, tax aggressiveness does not necessarily 
indicate that the firm has committed an illegal or improper act. Tax aggressiveness in the context 
of direct (income) taxes can be viewed as downward management of taxable income through tax-
planning activities (Frank, Lynch and Rego, 2009; Chen, Chen, Cheng and Shevlin, 2010; 
Richardson, Taylor and Lanis, 2013). Direct tax aggressive activities include the shifting of 
income or profits to offshore tax havens and the excessive claiming of tax deductions, e.g., 
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interest and R&D expenses, and tax losses that the corporation is normally not entitled to receive 
(Graham and Tucker, 2006; Frank et al., 2009; Lanis and Richardson, 2011). 
Direct taxes, however, are only a part of the firm’s overall tax exposure. Firms are also 
responsible for a variety of indirect taxes including sales tax, excise, and customs duty. For 
example, for our sample firms the mean direct tax expense is Indian Rupees (INR) 238.14 
million whereas mean indirect taxes amount to INR 551.22 million.3 The seller collects indirect 
taxes, which are usually charged on the selling price on ad valorem basis, from the consumer on 
behalf of the taxing authorities. Thus, indirect taxes increase the final price to the consumer and 
shift the demand curve, leading to deadweight loss. 
Prior studies report that indirect taxes not only affect purchasing behavior of consumers 
(e.g., Poterba 1996, Goolsbee 2000, Ballard and Lee 2007, Stehr 2007, and Anderson, Fong, 
Simester and Tucker, 2010) but also capacity and location decisions of firms (e.g., Manuszak and 
Moul, 2009). For example, recent studies such as Hoopes, Thornock and Williams (2016) focus 
on federal legislative proposals, such as the Marketplace Fairness Act, that aim to remove the 
preferential treatment given under state-level indirect tax laws to online retailers compared with 
brick-and-mortar businesses. Hoopes et al. (2016) find negative abnormal stock returns and a 
reduction in forecasted revenue for online firms following events that indicated an increased 
likelihood of federal sales tax legislation. Similarly, Baugh, Ben-David and Park (2018) report 
that after the imposition of sales taxes on online purchases, consumers shift their purchases away 
from online retailers in favor of brick-and-mortar businesses. In sum, indirect taxes are an 
important factor affecting both consumer and firm behavior. 
Tax aggressiveness with regards to indirect taxes takes a different form compared with 
                                               
3 US Dollar 1 = Indian Rupees (INR) 68.21, per the Reserve Bank of India’s reference exchange rate as of May 23, 
2018. 
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direct taxes, particularly in a complex indirect tax regime with multiple tax jurisdictions and 
cascading indirect taxes. Firms can reduce indirect taxes by structuring their business model or 
production and distribution operations to take advantage of the tax rules. In more extreme cases, 
firms can choose not to register for VAT, underreport sales (either price or quantity), misclassify 
commodities, present fraudulent invoices, or collect but not remit indirect taxes to the taxing 
authorities (Keen and Smith, 2007; Alm, Martinez-Vazquez, and Chandler, 2016). 
There is evidence of widespread indirect tax avoidance in developed as well as 
developing economies. Murray (1995) uses sales tax audit data from Tennessee Department of 
Revenue and reports that of the 2,178 sales tax accounts in his sample covering the period 1986-
1988, 396 (18.2% of the overall sample) were selected for audit with 372 accounts (17.1% of the 
overall sample, 93.9% of audited accounts) found to be noncompliant. Using Gross Receipt Tax 
data for New Mexico firms, Alm, Blackwell and McKee (2004) report that the average sales tax 
compliance rate is only 43% in their sample. The VAT system in the European Union has been 
the subject of criticism due to the opportunities for indirect tax evasion and fraud. For example, 
the European Commission (2004) noted that losses from fraud amounted to up to ten percent of 
net VAT receipts in some member states. More recently, Alm et al. (2016) compile international 
sales tax evasion data using World Enterprise Survey (WES) and the Business Environment and 
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) conducted by the World Bank. Their sample contains 
approximately 8,000 firms from 32 European countries that responded to the surveys. The 
average reported sales (i.e., percentage of sales reported for tax purposes) in the sample is about 
88.2%, implying sales tax non-compliance rate of about 11.8%. Furthermore, approximately 
40.5% of their sample firms report paying bribes to deal with sales tax issues, with the mean 
amount of the bribe being approximately 1.1% of sales. 
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In the context of India, the business press and academic researchers have long 
commented on the vastly complicated indirect tax regime that creates incentives to manipulate 
and evade indirect taxes (e.g., The Times of India, 2010; Kiran, 2015; Anand, 2017). In a well-
publicized recent case, indirect tax authorities detected sales tax evasion amounting to 
approximately INR 16 billion (approximately US$ 250 million) where sellers provided fake 
invoices to buyers (Times of India, March 27, 2013). Such indirect tax evasion is not limited to 
traders and small businesses alone, with well-known firms, such as, Bhushan Steel and Cadbury 
being under scrutiny for possible indirect tax evasion (The Hindu, 2012, 2013). As another 
prominent example, state indirect tax authorities took objection to Amazon selling goods on 
behalf of third-party sellers on its website and imposed steep fines on the company. Amazon 
successfully appealed the case, however at a significant cost, and was allowed to resume its 
online selling activities (Asthana, 2014; Nair and Balasubramanyam, 2014). 
2.2 Propensity to engage in indirect tax aggressiveness 
While the avoidance of income taxes can directly boost the net income, sales tax 
avoidance is likely to have more indirect effects on firm performance and shareholder value 
through its effect on the final selling price and, consequently, the firm’s revenues. Prior studies 
have documented the prevalence of indirect tax evasion, but there is limited evidence on factors 
that cause firms to engage in such behavior. We develop hypotheses regarding operational 
structure, organizational form and ownership characteristics, and potential synergies between 
direct and indirect tax avoidance that could prompt firms to pursue indirect tax aggressiveness. 
2.2.1 Operational structure 
Prior studies examine how multi-product firms realize economic benefits through transfer 
pricing and other financial strategies in addition to reaping operational synergies (e.g., Hill and 
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Hoskisson, 1981). Swenson (2001) studies how changes in tariffs and tax rates affect transfer 
pricing decisions at multinational firms. A greater number of product and service offerings is 
likely to lead to more opportunities for indirect tax manipulation through transfer pricing and 
related party transactions. Consistent with the above intuition, we expect that greater diversity in 
the firm’s product portfolio will lead to a higher propensity for indirect tax aggressiveness. 
We also examine if geographical concentration of the firm’s production facilities near its 
headquarters affects the firm’s indirect tax aggressiveness. There is a large literature on how 
geographical location affects firm decisions, and in particular, the effect of geographical 
proximity on collaboration and information sharing (e.g., Lerner, 1995; Coval and Moskowitz, 
1999; Massa and Rehman, 2008; Almazan, De Motta, Titman, and Uysal, 2010). We expect that 
firms with a larger proportion of their manufacturing operations closer to the headquarters can 
more easily coordinate production in such a way as to reduce the incidence of indirect taxes. 
Finally, we examine how the degree to which the firm has international operations affects 
its indirect tax avoidance. In addition to foreign operations being geographically distant from the 
headquarters and thus impeding coordination and information flows, overseas sales are also 
subject to foreign tax jurisdiction that are likely to be less susceptible to manipulations and 
influence-peddling. Prior studies document positive governance externalities arising from US 
and European cross listing for emerging economy firms (e.g., Coffee, 2002; Doidge, Karolyi, 
and Stulz, 2004; Fresard and Salva, 2010). Even for firms that are not cross listed, operations in 
developed economies are likely to be subject to scrutiny by overseas authorities, in addition to 
monitoring by other market intermediaries such as security analysts and the business press. 
Therefore, we expect firms that generate a significant proportion of their income through 
international operations will have reduced ability to manipulate their indirect taxes. 
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2.2.2 Synergies between direct and indirect tax aggressiveness 
Prior theoretical studies such as Marelli (1984) examine the link between avoidance of 
direct and indirect taxes, however to our knowledge no empirical study till date has focused in 
the potential interrelatedness of direct and indirect tax aggressiveness. Several strategies for 
income tax avoidance, such as complicated transfer pricing schemes, also affect the incidence of 
indirect taxes. Firms often avail of outside expertise through auditors and tax consultants to set 
up tax avoidance schemes that could affect both direct and indirect taxes. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that firms that have incentives or opportunities to engage in direct (income) 
tax avoidance will also be likely to undertake aggressive indirect tax positions. We test whether 
direct tax aggressiveness is associated with the propensity to avoid indirect taxes. 
2.2.3 Ownership concentration and entrenchment 
We also examine how ownership concentration and entrenchment affect a firm’s 
incentives to avoid indirect taxes. Prior studies show that ownership concentration affects firm 
performance (e.g., Stulz, 1988; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988; Slovin and Sushka, 1993). In 
the context of indirect taxes, firms with concentrated ownership are shielded from external 
disciplining mechanisms, and therefore more likely to be able to exploit tax loopholes. As 
discussed in Chen et al. (2010) and Hanlon and Heitzmann (2010), firms with concentrated 
ownership may be more likely to avoid taxes because controlling owners benefit more from the 
savings.  On the other hand, ownership concentration can attenuate agency problems and make 
owners more sensitive to total costs of tax avoidance including reputation effects and resistance 
to diversion of tax savings from minority shareholders (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006; Chen et 
al., 2010; Hanlon and Heitzmann, 2010). On balance, the net effect of ownership concentration 
on the propensity to engage in indirect tax aggressiveness is an empirical issue. 
	
 
12 
We also examine whether affiliation with a business group affects indirect tax avoidance. 
Prior studies such as Khanna and Palepu (2000), and Khanna and Rivkin (2001) note that 
business groups arise in emerging economies as a response to market imperfections. Business 
groups help affiliated firms pool financial resources and managerial talent, often acting as 
internal capital markets, when external institutions are weak or nonexistent. At the same time, 
business groups also allow for tunneling of resources and are associated with political lobbying 
and regulatory capture (e.g., Fisman, 2001). We expect that firms affiliated with business groups 
are more likely to engage in indirect tax avoidance due to the interrelatedness of group firms that 
provides opportunities for related-party transactions and strategic placement of production and 
distribution activities, and due to a greater degree of entrenchment in the political economy. 
2.2.4 Financial constraints 
Prior studies in the context of direct taxes examine the association between financial 
constraints and cash savings generated through tax planning. Edwards, Schwab and Shevlin 
(2016) present evidence consistent with an increase in financial constraints leading firms to 
increase internally generated funds via tax planning. Financially constrained firms are likely to 
be under pressure to increase revenues as well as conserve cash. By avoiding the incidence of 
indirect taxes or delaying the collection or pass-through of indirect taxes from the end customer, 
firms can achieve the above objectives. Therefore, we expect that firms in poor financial health 
will be more likely to engage in indirect tax aggressiveness. 
2.4 Consequences of engaging in indirect tax aggressiveness 
There is a large literature on the consequences of income tax avoidance (see, e.g., Hanlon 
and Heitzmann, 2010, and Graham, Raedy, and Shackelford, 2012 for recent surveys). Prior 
studies document the costs of direct tax aggressiveness, including imposition of additional taxes, 
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interest and penalties (e.g., Crocker and Slemrod, 2005). Hanlon and Slemrod (2009) report a 
negative stock price reaction to news about a firm’s involvement in tax shelters. 
We study the consequences of indirect tax evasion in the specific context of recent 
indirect tax reforms in India, namely, the Goods and Services Tax (GST) Bill that was passed in 
the Parliament of India in August 2016. Prior to the passage of the Bill, Indian firms were 
governed by a complicated and multi-layered indirect tax regime. The Central (federal) 
government subjected the supply of goods and services to a variety of taxes, charges and fees 
including, but not limited to, Central Value Added Tax (CENVAT), service tax, central excise 
duty, additional customs duty (countervailing duty or CVD), and central surcharges. Various 
State (provincial) governments further imposed value-added taxes (VAT), state sales tax, 
entertainment tax, luxury tax, and entry tax. The multiplicity of tax types, jurisdictions and rule 
complexity increased the compliance burden, reduced operating efficiency, encouraged tax 
evasion and corruption, and created barriers to entry. While there were ongoing discussions to 
overhaul the indirect tax regime, efforts to introduce legislation did not come to fruition due to a 
lack of political consensus on the issue (Joshi and Ray, 2016; Padmanabhan, 2016). Finally, in 
an unexpected development, the Constitution (One Hundred and Twenty Second Amendment) 
Act, 2016, popularly known as the Goods and Services Tax (GST) Bill, was passed in the Indian 
Parliament in August 2016. 
The GST Bill was widely hailed by practitioners and the business press as one of the 
most significant tax reforms in India (Anand, 2017; Abrams, Nayak, and Kala, 2017). The Bill 
entitles the Central government to tax sale of goods and the States to tax provision of services. 
The bill also grants the Central government the exclusive right to impose GST on imports and 
inter-state trade. There are provisions for tax revenue sharing between the Central and State 
	
 
14 
governments under the Bill. Resolution of any tax related disputes between the Central and State 
governments is to be carried out by a Dispute Settlement Authority, superseded only by the 
Supreme Court of India. Through simplification of the tax code and streamlining of the tax 
administration, the GST Bill represents a complete overhaul of the indirect tax regime in India. 
On the other hand, the GST Bill institutes formal procedures and documentation requirements 
(e.g., recording of tax collection at source) that are likely to increase compliance costs. The 
positive effects of the GST Bill in certain sectors of the economy could also prove to be 
detrimental to other sectors, at least in the short run. For example, the transportation sector is 
expected to benefit since GST will subsume multiple local taxes, reduce time at checkpoints, and 
ease other logistical hurdles. However, due to increased productivity, transportation firms may 
choose not to expand their fleets, thus negatively affecting vehicle manufacturers. 
Finally, there is another aspect of indirect tax harmonization that could impose costs on 
some businesses even as compliance costs are reduced for others. Some firms may have adapted 
to the prevailing tax regime by developing expertise in dealing with complicated tax rules. Such 
firms often hire external tax experts in addition to developing in-house knowhow. Some firms 
may even cultivate relationships with tax authorities and politicians in order to receive favorable 
tax treatment. Many firms adopt aggressive tax policies such as disputing the assessed taxes, 
paying only a part of the overall taxes assessed. If the prevailing indirect tax regime is simplified 
and compliance is made easier, then such entrenched firms could not only lose their relationship 
capital but also have fewer avenues to manipulate taxes in the future. 
We view the GST Bill as an exogenous shock to the economy and use the stock price 
reaction of firms to the passage of the Bill as an empirical proxy for the estimated shareholder 
value change as a result of the indirect tax harmonization and simplification. We expect that 
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entrenched firms that have engaged in aggressive indirect tax avoidance in the past would stand 
to lose from the simplification of the tax rules. Therefore, we expect firms with indicators of past 
tax avoidance to experience negative stock returns when the GST Bill is passed. On the other 
hand, firms that are better-connected and have sufficient liquid resources would be better able to 
weather the storm and, therefore, not suffer as much as their other tax-aggressive peers. 
We also test how the expected implementation affects the firm’s stock price response to 
the new legislation. In particular, we examine how the likelihood of timely and effective 
implementation of the new tax rules at the state level affects investor’s assessment of value loss 
for tax aggressive firms. Using the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings of Indian 
states as a proxy for the quality of state-level governance and the likelihood of enforcement of 
the tax reforms, we examine whether the firm-level stock price reaction to the GST Bill differs 
between states with higher governance ratings and those with low governance ratings. 
As discussed above, many developing market economies including India have a 
prevalence of business groups that allow distinct legal entities operating in diverse industries to 
operate under one umbrella, often engaging in cross-selling and internal capital transfers. We 
expect firms affiliated to business groups to be able to bear the shock of tax rule change more 
easily than unaffiliated firms. Therefore, we divide our sample into two partitions, one 
containing business group firms and the other containing standalone firms, and test whether the 
stock price reaction to the GST Bill differs systematically across the two sample partitions. 
Below we describe our empirical research design and the results of our analysis. 
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3.   Empirical Analysis: Propensity to Engage in Indirect Tax Aggressiveness 
We implement our empirical analysis in two stages. In the first stage, we investigate 
factors affecting the propensity to avoid indirect taxes. We use the amount of disputed sales tax 
contingent liabilities as an empirical proxy for indirect tax aggressiveness and examine how 
operational and ownership characteristics of the firm drive the level of tax aggressiveness. In the 
second stage analysis focusing on the cost of tax aggressiveness, we use short-window abnormal 
stock returns surrounding the passage of the GST Bill as the empirical measure of the firm-level 
valuation effects arising from the tax reforms. As discussed above, the GST Bill is an exogenous 
shock that presents a good setting to isolate the wealth effects of tax regulation. 
3.1 Research design 
We estimate the following regression at the firm level: 
TAX_AGGRESSIVEi,t = α0 + α1Prod_Diversityi,t + α2Proximity_HQi,t + α3Int_Opsi,t + 
α4Book_Tax_Diffi,t + α5Tax_Advicei,t + α6Prom_Holdi,t + α7BGi,t + α8Z-Scorei,t + 
Controls + εt          (1) 
The dependent variable in equation (1), TAX_AGGRESSIVE, is firm level indirect tax 
avoidance. Prior studies such as Richardson et al. (2013) use disputed income tax contingent 
liabilities as an empirical proxy for income tax aggressiveness. We adapt the above measure to 
our setting and use the amount of contingent liabilities related to sales tax disputes as an 
empirical proxy for the firm’s degree of indirect tax aggressiveness. 
Indian Accounting Standard (AS) 29 Contingent Liabilities, Provisions, and Contingent 
Assets requires companies to disclose provisions and contingent liabilities including obligations 
that could arise in relation with litigations and disputes. Contingent liabilities related to indirect 
taxes such as sales tax, excise, and customs duty fall under the above disclosure requirements. 
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For example, Tata Motors, a leading automobile manufacturer, disclosed in its annual report for 
the fiscal year 2016-2017 that “[t]he total sales tax demands (including interest and penalty), that 
are being contested by the Company amount to INR 1,057.93 crores4, which includes INR 11.54 
crores in respect of equity accounted investees as at March 31, 2017.” (See Exhibit I for details). 
Accordingly, we define TAX_AGGRESSIVE as the amount of contingent (disputed) sales tax 
liabilities deflated by revenues, averaged over the prior three years. 
As discussed in section 2.2, our first independent variable of interest is Prod_Diversity, a 
dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the firm operates in more product segments than the 
industry median, and 0 otherwise. Consistent with the arguments above, we expect 
Prod_Diversity to have a positive coefficient in the regression of indirect tax aggressiveness. We 
define our next variable, Proximity_HQ, as the proportion of manufacturing facilities that are 
located in the same state as the firm headquarters. Consistent with geographical proximity 
enabling better control and information flows, we expect this variable to have a positive 
coefficient. Finally, we define Int_Ops as the proportion of total income that is earned overseas 
and expect it to have a negative association with indirect tax aggressiveness due to the reduced 
ability to manipulate indirect taxes in international jurisdictions. 
We measure the degree of direct tax aggressiveness as Book_Tax_Diff, which is defined 
as the difference between reporting (book) pre-tax income and taxable income according to tax 
filings (see, e.g., Manzon and Plesko, 2002). The above measure has been extensively used in the 
prior literature as an empirical proxy for income tax avoidance.5 To the extent there are synergies 
between direct and indirect tax avoidance, Book_Tax_Diff will have a positive coefficient. We 
also capture the level of the firm’s outlays in tax planning via Tax_Advice, a dummy variable 
                                               
4 1 crore = 10 million. 
5 Our results are robust to the use of alternative proxies used in, e.g., Desai and Dharmapala (2006). 
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that takes the value 1 if the firm avails of tax-related services from its external auditor and 0 
otherwise. Similar to the arguments for Book_Tax_Diff, we expect firms receiving tax advice to 
be more aggressive with regards to indirect taxes. 
We next turn to factors related to ownership characteristics and entrenchment. In 
emerging market economies such as India there is a dominance of family firms that have higher 
ownership concentration, and also firms affiliated to business groups. Prior literature shows that 
such firms are likely to cultivate political connections and engage in lobbying for favors at 
national and local levels. Therefore, such firms are likely to be more entrenched in the system 
and better positioned to take advantage of loopholes and tax avoidance strategies. To capture the 
above effects, we use Prom_Hold, the percentage of shares owned by controlling shareholders or 
“promoters”6, and BG, an indicator variable capturing membership in a business group. We 
expect both the above variables to exhibit a positive association with TAX_AGGRESSIVE. 
Our empirical proxy for financial health of the firms is based on Altman’s Z-Score, a 
well-known measure capturing financial soundness. We construct a modified version of the 
above measure developed by Altman (2005) that is calibrated for emerging markets economies. 
We expect Z-Score to have a negative association with the propensity for indirect tax avoidance, 
consistent with financial healthy firms less likely to face pressure to avoid taxes. 
We also include a variety of control variables that could have an influence on the firm’s 
propensity to avoid indirect taxes. For example, firms are required to place a security deposit 
under an escrow account with the government while their tax appeal is pending. The requirement 
                                               
6As defined by the Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI), a “promoter” means ‘the person or persons who are 
in control of the company, directly or indirectly, whether as shareholder, director or otherwise; or person or persons 
named as promoters in any document of offer of securities to the public or existing shareholders or in the 
shareholding pattern, disclosed by the company under the provisions of the Listing Agreement’ 
(https://www.sebi.gov.in/acts/act15a.html). 
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to set aside funds in the escrow account can affect the firm’s propensity to engage in indirect tax 
evasion. We explicitly control for such deposits with the government with our ESCROW 
variable, defined as the amount of statutory deposits placed with the taxing authorities deflated 
by total assets. We also control for the amount of (direct) corporate taxes paid (Corp_Tax) since 
such amounts could be associated with both direct and indirect tax planning. Our empirical proxy 
for the strength of corporate governance, Corp_Gov, is a score variable capturing the quality of 
corporate governance of the firm, constructed using firm disclosures similar to Hawas and Tse 
(2016). Other control variables include tangible asset intensity of the firm (Tangibility), research 
and development expenditures (R&D), financial leverage (Lev), price-to-book ratio to capture 
growth opportunities (PB), firm profitability (ROE), and firm size (MCAP). Finally, we also 
include BIG4, a dummy variable for auditors affiliated with the largest four audit firms, as a 
proxy for the quality of auditor oversight. 
3.2 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
Financial data and firm level daily security price data are obtained from PROWESS 
database maintained by the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE), which provides 
comprehensive firm level financial information mainly drawn from annual reports of the firms. 
Data from PROWESS has been extensively used by several studies focusing on Indian firms [see, 
for example, Gopalan, Nanda and Seru (2007), Khanna and Palepu (2000), and Gopalan and 
Gormley (2013)]. We start with all public firms on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE). We 
exclude firms: (1) belonging to finance, insurance, or regulated sectors, (2) with majority 
ownership by the government, (3) with negative net worth, (4) whose share prices or financial 
variables used in the regression are not available. Our final analysis includes 16,798 observations 
derived from 2,451 public firms over 2006-2015. 
	
 
20 
 [INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent variables used in 
our test. Untabulated results show that 5,861 firm-year observations in our sample 
(approximately 35% of the total sample of 16,798 firm-year observations) have non-zero 
disputed sales tax contingent liabilities, with mean (median) liabilities amounting to 
approximately INR 1.90 million (INR 54.10 million). As the above statistics suggest, a majority 
of the firms do not report disputed sales tax liabilities, indicating that the propensity to avoid 
indirect taxes is concentrated in a relatively small proportion of the population. 
TAX_AGGRESSIVE, the three-year average of the amount of disputed sales tax liabilities 
deflated by total revenues, has a mean (median) value of 0.0038 (0.00). While the above 
indicates that the amount of sales tax avoidance is small in relation to total sales, it is nonetheless 
significant compared with the amount of sales taxes paid.7 Prod_Diversity has a mean value of 
0.5927, indicating that approximately 59% of our sample firms offer a large variety of products 
and services. Proximity_HQ has a mean (median) value of 0.4778 (0.4444), implying that the 
average firm in the sample has less than half its manufacturing facilities located in the same state 
as its headquarters. Int_Ops, which captures the proportion of income derived from international 
operations, has a mean (median) value of 0.1846 (0.0507). 
Among variables capturing potential synergies with direct tax avoidance, Book_Tax_Diff, 
the difference between reporting (book) and tax income, has a mean value of 0.01 implying that 
the average sample firm has relatively lower tax income, indicating the extent of direct tax 
aggressiveness. Tax_Advice, the indicator variable for firms seeking tax-related advice from their 
                                               
7 Untabulated results indicate that the average sales for our sample firms are INR 548.60 million, and the amount of 
sales tax paid has a mean value of INR 0.90 million. Therefore, disputed sales tax liabilities are more than double 
the amount of sales taxes paid, on average. 
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auditors, has a mean value of 0.166, suggesting nearly 17% of sample firms employ outside 
expertise in tax planning. Approximately 42% of sample observations are derived from firms 
affiliated with business groups, confirming the findings in prior studies such as Khanna and 
Palepu (2000) and Fisman (2001) that emerging market economies such as India are dominated 
by the presence of business groups. Our sample firms also exhibit relatively high levels of 
promoter ownership as evidenced by mean (median) promoter shareholding of 0.42 (0.65). The 
average (median) Z-Score for our sample firms is 5.50 (5.54) indicating that the average firm is 
in good financial health, and does not face significant financial constraints. 
Among control variables, the corporate governance proxy, Corp_Gov, has a mean 
(median) value of 0.75 (0.77) implying a fairly high level of compliance with corporate 
governance norms. Firms are required to set aside funds in an escrow account pending their tax 
appeal. As revealed by the mean value of ESCROW, such funds are of comparable magnitude to 
the amount of sales taxes under dispute. Finally, the average sample firm is large with market 
capitalization of approximately INR 203 million (equivalent to approximately USD 3 million), 
with reasonable growth prospects (mean price-to-book ratio of 2.02) and healthy profits (mean 
ROE of 0.11). 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Table 2 presents Pearson correlations among our dependent and independent variables. 
For brevity, we focus on the correlations of our tax aggressiveness measures with the key 
independent variables.  TAX_AGGRESSIVE, our measure of sales tax avoidance, exhibits several 
univariate correlations that are in the expected direction and statistically significant at the 5% 
level. For example, consistent with our expectations, TAX_AGGRESSIVE is positively correlated 
with both Prod_Diversity (corr. coeff.=0.0169) and Proximity_HQ (corr. coeff.=0.0203), but 
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negatively correlated with Int_Ops (corr. coeff.=-0.0368). The degree of indirect tax 
aggressiveness is also positively (negatively) correlated with business group affiliation (Z-Score) 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.0213 (-0.0646). 
3.3 Empirical results 
We now discuss the results of multivariate regressions using TAX_AGGRESSIVE as the 
dependent variable. In Table 3, we present results of our regression analyses containing Model 
(1) with operational structure variables, Model (2) with direct tax avoidance complementarity 
measures, and Model (3) with proxies for ownership concentration and systemic entrenchment. 
Finally, Model (4) contains all of the hypothesized variables along with controls. 
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
As reported in Model (1), and consistent with our expectations, Prod_Diversity and 
Proximity_HQ have significantly positive coefficients, implying that firms wither greater product 
diversity and more concentrated operations have a greater propensity to avoid sales taxes. On the 
other hand, Int_Ops, the extent of international sales, has a negative coefficient, suggesting firms 
with significant overseas operations find it relatively harder to avoid sales taxes. In Model (2), 
we find that, consistent with our expectations, both Book_Tax_Diff and Tax_Advice have positive 
coefficients, although only the coefficient on Book_Tax_Diff is statistically significant at the 
conventional levels. This is indicative of complementarities between direct and indirect tax 
avoidance. As reported in Model (3), both our measures, Prom_Hold and BG, have significantly 
positive coefficients, suggesting ownership concentration and business group affiliation are 
positively associated with indirect tax aggressiveness. Finally, Model (4) includes all the 
hypothesized variables, in addition to our measure of the firm’s financial health, Z-Score, along 
with controls. We note that all the variables of interest retain their coefficient sign and 
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significance levels. In particular, Book_Tax_Diff and Tax_Advice both have significantly positive 
coefficients. In addition, Z-Score has a significantly negative coefficient, implying that 
financially healthy firms are less likely to engage in indirect tax aggressiveness. 
 
4.   Empirical Analysis: Tax Reform and Consequences of Indirect Tax Aggressiveness 
As discussed above, we treat the passage of the GST Bill as an exogenous shock to the 
Indian economy and use the average change in equity value as an empirical proxy for the net 
firm-level impact of the new legislation. In particular, we conjecture that firms that have 
previously engaged in indirect tax aggressiveness would be negatively impacted by the change in 
the indirect tax regime. In addition, firms operating in better-governed tax jurisdictions that have 
a higher probability of timely implementation of the new rules are likely to feel the brunt of the 
reform. On the other hand, sufficiently endowed firms are less likely to find themselves 
constrained due to the possibility of back tax payments. Below we describe our empirical 
research design and sample selection, and then discuss the results of our analysis. 
4.1 Research design 
To analyze the firm-level stock price reaction to the passage of the GST Bill, we estimate 
the following regressions at the firm level, which is consistent with prior studies such as 
Armstrong, Barth, Jagolinzer and Larcker (2010) and Sikes, Tian and Wilson (2014): 
CARi,t = α0 + α1TAX_AGGRESSIVEi,t-1 + α2 Cashi,t-1 + α3STATE_GOVi,t-1 
+ Controls + εt               (2) 
 
The dependent variable is the five-day firm level cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
surrounding the passage of the GST Bill. As discussed above, TAX_AGGRESSIVE, the average 
disputed sales tax contingent liability deflated by revenues, is our measure of firm-level indirect 
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tax avoidance. If the tax reforms impose a net cost on firms invested in indirect tax avoidance 
strategies, then TAX_AGGRESSIVE should have a negative coefficient. 
We capture the availability of liquid resources at the firm’s disposal in the form of cash 
and cash equivalent by using Cash variable. We expect that such resources will allow the firm to 
adapt to the new tax regime and settle past dues. Hence Cash should have positive relationship 
with our dependent variable. Our next variable of interest is STATE_GOV, a dummy variable 
capturing the quality of governance in the state where the firm is registered. The World Bank 
publishes Ease of Doing Business rankings for Indian states. We code STATE_GOV as 1 for 
firms registered in states that belong in the top quartile of the World Bank rankings distribution, 
and 0 otherwise. The regression includes a variety of control variables, such as, profitability 
(ROE), firm size (MCAP), and prior year market return (Pre_Ret). We also include the number 
of product segments (Segment) and escrow deposits (Escrow). We use industry clustering for 
standard errors in our regression (we get similar results with the inclusion of industry dummies). 
4.2  Sample Selection and Measurement of Firm-Level Abnormal Returns 
We start with all publicly listed firms on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and, as 
discussed in Section 3, eliminate firms: (1) belonging to finance, insurance, or regulated sectors, 
(2) with majority ownership by the government, (3) with negative net worth, (4) whose share 
prices or financial variables used in the regression model are not available. Our final sample 
includes 2,685 observations. We estimate a market model of firm-level returns by regressing 
firm returns on value-weighted market returns over a 360-trading day period extending from day 
-365 to day -5 prior to the passage of the GST Bill. Daily firm level abnormal returns are 
cumulated over five days around the event day, beginning with day -3 and ending with day +1 to 
yield our firm level cumulative abnormal return measure, CAR. 
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4.3  Sample Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4 reports descriptive statistics for key variables used in our cross-sectional analysis 
of firm-level stock price reaction to the passage of the GST Bill. The average five-day abnormal 
return at the firm level, CAR, is negative. The mean (median) CAR is -0.012 (-0.013), which is 
statistically different from zero at the 1% level. The average firm in the sample has mean 
(median) ROE of -0.012 (0.036). The mean (median) prior year return is 9.88% (2.8%) and Cash 
ratio is 2.54 (0.76). The average firm in the sample is also relatively large with a mean asset base 
(market capitalization) of INR 1,545.65 million (INR 449.97 million).8 
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Table 5 reports Pearson univariate correlation between variables. Since we do not 
develop hypotheses on correlations among specific variables, except for the relation between the 
market reaction and disputed taxes, we omit a detailed discussion of correlations for brevity. We 
note that CAR, the firm-level stock price reaction to the passage of the GST Bill, is significantly 
negatively correlated with the level of disputed sales tax contingent liabilities, and positively and 
significantly related with Cash. This is consistent with our expectations. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
4.4  Results of Multivariate Regression 
We report estimation results from our multivariate regressions in Table 6. 
[INSERT TABLE 6 HERE] 
As reported in the table, the coefficient on disputed sales tax contingent liability, 
TAX_AGGRESSIVE,  is negative and highly statistically significant (coefficient estimate=-
0.0196, p-value=0.001), implying that firms with higher levels of indirect tax aggressiveness 
                                               
8 In regression analysis we use the natural log of firm size. Also, all continuous variables are winsorized at the 
extreme 1% tails. 
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have significantly lower abnormal return at the time of the passage of the GST Bill. Our measure 
of firm level liquidity (Cash) has a positive and significant coefficient (coefficient 
estimate=0.0002, p-value=0.008), suggesting that firms with liquid resources experience higher 
abnormal return at the time of passage of GST bill. Our other variable of interest, i.e., state 
governance variable, STATE_GOV, also has a significantly positive coefficient (coefficient 
estimate=0.0090, p-value=0.012), suggesting that the GST Bill is perceived by investors as 
bringing net benefits to firms registered in well-governed states. Overall, the above results are 
consistent with our expectations and underscore shareholder value consequences of engaging in 
indirect tax aggressiveness when such opportunities are taken away. 
4.5 Endogeneity Concerns: Two-Stage Heckman-Style Analysis  
There could be concerns that our results are driven by potential endogeneity between 
factors affecting indirect tax aggressiveness and the stock price reaction experienced by firms at 
the passage of the GST Bill. To address such concerns, we implement a two-stage analysis (see, 
e.g., Heckman, 1979; and Maddala, 1983). Specifically, we first estimate a first-stage probit 
model of the determinants of indirect tax aggressiveness where the dependent variable, 
TAX_AGGRESSIVE_dummy, is a binary variable coded as 1 if the firm reports a sales tax 
contingent liability, and 0 otherwise. This probit regression includes independent variables 
discussed in Section 3. We then generate the inverse Mill ratio (IMR) from this model, lambda, 
that is included in the second-stage OLS regression of event period CARs on the disputed sales 
tax dummy and other variables of interest. The results of this analysis are reported in Table 7. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 HERE] 
As reported in Panel A of Table 7, a majority of the hypothesized factors affecting 
indirect tax aggressiveness have the expected coefficient signs, albeit with diminished statistical 
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significance due to a large reduction in sample size (as well as a potential loss in information due 
to our use of a binary variable rather than a continuous variable). This gives us confidence that 
our empirical model of indirect tax aggressiveness is robust to alternative variable measurement. 
As discussed above, the IMR from the first stage model, Lambda, is then included in the return 
regression in Panel B of Table 7. As reported in the Table, our indirect tax aggressiveness 
variable, TAX_AGGRESSIVE_Dummy, retains its significantly negative coefficient across all 
regression models. Therefore, it does not appear that potential endogeneity is driving our results. 
4.6 Endogeneity Concerns: Regression Discontinuity Design 
The two-stage Heckman selection model discussed above addresses potential sample 
selection bias and corroborates our main findings. However, there could still be other 
econometric concerns such as correlated omitted variable bias and causality. To help alleviate 
such concerns, we further test our main model by employing regression discontinuity (RD) 
research design (e.g., Lee and Lemieux, 2010). An RD test essentially compares the outcomes 
just above and just below an intervention threshold which separates the treatment sample from 
the control sample. Since the intervention being studied typically arises out of an exogenous 
shock (passage of the GST Bill, in our case), firms do not have any influence over the outcome 
(in our setting, the stock market reaction to the passage of the GST Bill). If the treatment and 
control samples have similar characteristics prior to the intervention, then any observed 
difference in outcomes would be attributable to the intervention that creates the discontinuity in 
outcomes between treatment and control samples. In sum, as discussed in Lee and Lemieux 
(2010) and Atanasov and Black (2016), an RD test design is a close approximation of a 
randomized experiment. 
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Our study focuses on firms that were tax aggressive prior to the passage of the GST Bill, 
and that experience a negative stock price reaction at the time of the regulatory intervention. We 
expect the negative stock price reaction to be more severe for firms that were relatively more tax 
aggressive in the pre-GST regime. We define firms as being more (less) aggressive if their 
average disputed sales tax contingent liability deflated by revenues is above (below) the sample 
median value. In other words, median disputed sales tax contingent liability provides the 
threshold that separates treatment (tax aggressive) observations from control (non-tax 
aggressive) observations in our setting. 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
We begin by presenting graphical evidence on stock price reaction around the passage of 
the GST Bill. In Figure 1, Panel A, we observe a discontinuity in abnormal stock price reaction 
around the threshold of median disputed sales tax contingent liability deflated by revenues. Firms 
to the right of the threshold, that are more tax aggressive, experience significantly lower 
abnormal return compared to firms on the left of the threshold, that are less tax aggressive. We 
also conduct a placebo test using three randomly generated event dates and plot abnormal returns 
around the threshold on these dates. In Panels B, D and D of Figure 1 we do not observe a 
similar discontinuity in that the market reaction for tax aggressive (treatment) firms is 
statistically indistinguishable from the market reaction for non-tax aggressive (control) firms. 
This provides preliminary assurance that in our setting it is the intervention (passage of the GST 
Bill), and not the partitioning of the sample into two groups imposed by us, that causes a 
discontinuity in the observed abnormal returns. 
We next turn to formal RD regression analysis by focusing on the sub-sample of firms 
that have non-zero disputed sales tax contingent liabilities. As reported in Table 8, Panel A, of 
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the 2,685 firms in our initial sample, 710 firms (26.4% of the sample) have non-zero disputed tax 
liabilities. The sub-sample comprises firms that are larger on average than firms in the 
population. For example, the mean total assets for firms with disputed tax liabilities are INR 
29,713.1 million compared with mean total assets of INR 17,035.1 million for the entire 
population. For the sub-sample under study, the median value of average disputed sales tax 
contingent liabilities deflated by revenues has a mean (median) value of 0.0318 (0.0042), 
indicating the presence of some firms with a large amount of disputed taxes in the sample. Given 
the skewness in the distribution of disputed sales tax contingent liabilities, we use the median 
value as the threshold. 
Similar to prior studies using an RD test design, such as Cuesta and Imai (2016) and 
Bradley, Kim and Tian (2017), our RD test examines the difference in the mean outcomes for the 
treatment sample and the control sample, respectively. We start by examining whether our 
partitioning of the sample into tax aggressive firms (treatment sample) and non-tax aggressive 
firms (control sample) satisfies the necessary conditions for conducting RD analysis. As reported 
in Table 8, Panel B, firms in the two group of observations on either side of the threshold appear 
to be similar on all the other characteristics, with the exception that they are more or less 
aggressive based on median disputed tax threshold. This supports our argument that any 
observed difference in abnormal return around the threshold would be due to the intervention, 
i.e., passage of the GST Bill, and not due to some other factors. In implementing the RD 
regression, we utilize triangular kernel along with optimal bandwidths as described in prior 
studies such as Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012). We use the same set of controls as used in the 
main regression Equation (2). We report RD regression results in Panel C of Table 8. Given our 
sample restrictions, our analysis is carried out on a significantly smaller sample containing only 
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169 observations. Nonetheless, results from the RD regression continue to support our main 
analysis. Specifically, we document negative and significant market reaction for tax aggressive 
firms (coefficient magnitude for TAX_AGGRESSIVE = -0.0461, p-value=0.0006) at the passage 
of the GST Bill. To summarize, results of our regression discontinuity test support inference 
from our main analysis, and when combined with the Heckman-style two stage analysis 
discussed above, these results provide assurance that our inferences are not driven by 
econometric issues such as selection bias, correlated omitted variables, or endogeneity concerns. 
4.7 Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests 
We next implement several additional analyses (untabulated) to gain further insights into 
shareholder wealth effects of the tax reform. We first split our sample based on business group 
affiliation. Approximately 36% of all firms are group affiliated, while the remaining 64% are 
standalone (unaffiliated) firms. We estimate our regression models from Table 5 separately in the 
two sample partitions and find that while the coefficient on disputed sales tax liability is negative 
for business group firms as well as for standalone firms, the results are stronger for standalone 
firms. Results for Cash and STATE_GOV suggest that the adjustment costs to conform to the 
new tax regime are likely to be higher for standalone firms. In contrast, business group firms 
appear to have smaller costs, possibly due to the presence of internal capital markets and support 
from other affiliated firms. 
We also split our sample based on the political climate in the state where the firms are 
registered. We identify whether the State government is ruled by the same political party as the 
party in power at the Center (Bharatiya Janata Party, or the BJP). Our objective is to see whether 
the there is any systematic difference in the stock price reaction for firms located in states where 
the GST Bill is likely to be implemented more effectively due to having the same party in power 
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at both central and state levels. This analysis suggests that our market reaction results are mainly 
driven by firm registered in states where the likely effectiveness of indirect tax reforms is higher. 
We carry out several robustness analyses to ensure that our results are not driven by our 
test specification and variable measurement choices. First, we replace our indirect tax measures 
by dummy variables indicating the presence of disputed sales taxes and overall indirect taxes, 
and find that our results remain qualitatively similar. Our results are also robust to alternative 
event window definitions, e.g., two trading days before through two trading days after the event 
date. We also use other control variables, such as return on assets (ROA) as an alternative 
profitability measure, and find the results are essentially unchanged. With respect to cumulative 
abnormal return (CAR), we use the BSE SENSEX index return instead of the value-weighted 
return in our market model and find qualitatively similar results. 
We also carry out a placebo test to support our hypotheses regarding the firm level stock 
price reaction to the passage of the GST Bill. It could be argued that the variation in firm-level 
stock price reaction we document is not necessarily caused by investors’ expectations of the 
effects of the GST Bill, but rather that, for example, firms engaging in aggressive tax behavior 
(liquid firms) may in general experience negative (positive) abnormal returns. If this alternative 
argument is true, then we should not observe a systematic association between the firm level 
abnormal stock returns and our hypothesized causal factors on other (non-event) dates. 
Consistent with the above argument, we carry out a placebo test by generating three random 
event dates and calculate value weighted CAR treating the above random dates as if they were 
true event dates. We then estimate our Equation 4 regression in all the three cases. We do not 
find our variables of interest to be statistically significant in any of these regressions. The 
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absence of our hypothesized effects on the above randomly chosen non-event dates supports our 
claim that the evidence provided by us is specific to the passage of the GST bill. 
  
5.  Conclusion 
We examine the incentives for firms to engage in indirect tax evasion, and the 
consequences of such conduct. Prior studies have focused on factors influencing direct tax 
avoidance (e.g., income tax) and found that avoiding or evading direct taxes can lead to a range 
of potentially negative consequences, including monetary penalties and loss of reputation. 
However, direct taxes are only a part of a firm’s total tax exposure, with indirect taxes such as 
sales tax, customs and excise being a significant responsibility at the firm level. Even though 
indirect taxes do not directly affect the firm’s bottom line, they can affect the end demand and, 
therefore, the firm’s revenues due to their effect on the price of final as well as intermediate 
goods. There is evidence in the prior literature that just as in the case of direct taxes, firms 
engage in extensive indirect tax evasion.  
We examine how a firm’s operational and organizational characteristics, propensity to 
avoid income taxes, ownership concentration, systemic entrenchment, and financial constraints 
affect the firm’s degree of indirect tax aggressiveness. Further, we also use an exogenous shock 
to the economy, i.e., the Good and Services Tax (GST) Bill that represents an overhaul of the 
prevailing indirect tax regime in India, to study the consequences of engaging in indirect tax 
aggressiveness. Prior studies, largely in the context of direct taxes, have found that both 
individuals and firms undertake significant risks of aggressive tax planning. Such risks include 
potential monetary penalties and imprisonment in extreme cases, but also reputation loss and 
diminished labor market prospects. However, there is a paucity of appropriate settings where a 
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causal relation can be established between tax aggressiveness and its theorized consequences. 
Therefore, our focus on the incentives to avoid indirect taxes and the consequences of such 
behavior adds new evidence to the literature. 
Using a sample of Indian public firms, we find that firms with greater product diversity 
and geographically concentrated operations (international operations) are more (less) aggressive 
in their efforts to avoid sales taxes. We also find evidence of a complementary relationship 
between direct and indirect tax avoidance in that firms more likely to avoid income taxes are also 
more likely to avoid sales taxes. Concentrated ownership and systemic entrenchment, as 
evidenced by the firm’s membership in a business group, are positively associated with the 
propensity to avoid sales taxes. Finally, financially constrained firms are also more aggressive in 
regards to indirect taxes. Turning to the consequences of indirect tax avoidance, we find that 
firms with higher disputed sales tax liabilities suffer a negative stock price reaction on the 
announcement of indirect tax reforms. This is consistent with tax aggressive firms experiencing 
shareholder wealth loss not only because of a greater likelihood of having to pay back taxes but 
also because the tax reform likely eliminated future tax evasion opportunities. We also find that 
such negative stock price reaction is concentrated in jurisdictions where the probability of timely 
and efficient enforcement of the new indirect tax rules is higher, and that firms that are better-
connected or have sufficient cash reserves on hand appear to be well-positioned to manage the 
transition to the new indirect tax regime. 
Our study is the among the few empirical studies to focus on indirect taxes, and the first 
to our knowledge to exploit an exogenous shock in the form of economy-wide tax reforms to 
study the consequences of indirect tax avoidance. Indirect taxes are an important component of 
the firm’s total tax burden, however the incentives to avoid indirect taxes and the consequences 
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of such behavior are not well-understood due to relative scarcity of prior studies in this area. Our 
paper seeks to fill this gap in the literature. Our results are likely to be of interest to not only tax 
scholars, but also investors, tax regulators and practitioners.  
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Exhibit I 
 
Tata Motors Limited 
Excerpts from the Annual Report for the Financial Year 2016-2017 
 
Notes Forming Part of Consolidated Financial Statements (page F-127) 
 
37. Commitments and Contingencies 
 
Sales Tax 
 
The total sales tax demands (including interest and penalty), that are being contested by the 
Company amount to R1,057.93 crores9, which includes R11.54 crores in respect of equity 
accounted investees as at March 31, 2017 (R1,251.38 crores, which includes R22.79 crores in 
respect of equity accounted investees, as at March 31, 2016 and R993.15 crores, which includes 
R22.65 crores in respect of equity accounted investees, as at April 1, 2015). The details of the 
demands for more than R20 crores are as follows: 
 
The Sales Tax Authorities have raised demand of R208.59 crores (R403.38 crores as at March 
31, 2016 and R120.12 crores as at April 1, 2015) towards rejection of certain statutory forms for 
concessional lower/nil tax rate (Form F and Form C) on technical grounds such as late 
submission, single form issued against different months/quarters dispatches/sales, etc. and denial 
of exemption from tax in absence of proof of export for certain years. The Company has 
contended that the benefit cannot be denied on technicalities, which are being complied with. 
The matter is pending at various levels. 
 
In some of the states in India, the Sales Tax Authorities have raised disputes totaling up to 
R40.80 crores as at March 31, 2017 (R41.10 crores as at March 31, 2016 and R41.10 crores as at 
April 1, 2015), treating the stock transfers of vehicles from the Company’s manufacturing plants 
to regional sales offices and the transfers between two regional sales offices as sales liable for 
levy of sales tax. The Company is contesting this issue. 
 
The Sales Tax Authorities have denied input tax credit and levied interest and penalty thereon 
due to varied reasons aggregating to R305.46 crores as at March 31, 2017 (R330.17 crores as at 
March 31, 2016 and R366.45 crores as at April 1, 2015). The reasons for disallowing credit was 
mainly due to Taxes not paid by Vendors, incorrect method of calculation of set off as per the 
department, alleging suppression of sales as per the department etc. The matter is contested in 
appeal. 
 
Sales tax demand aggregating R258.35 crores as at March 31, 2017 (R252.66 crores as at March 
31, 2016 and R258.40 crores as at April 1, 2015) has been raised by Sales Tax Authorities 
disallowing the concessional rate of 2% on certain purchases of raw materials in case the final 
product is stock transferred for sale outside the state. The matter is pending with various 
authorities. 
                                               
9 1 crore = 10 million 
   US Dollar 1 = Indian Rupees (INR) 68.21, per Reserve Bank of India’s reference rate as of May 23, 2018. 
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Appendix I 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
BG A dummy variable coded as 1 if the firm is affiliated to a business group, 0 otherwise. 
BIG4  A dummy variable coded as 1 if a firm is audited by a big-4 auditor or its affiliates, 0 otherwise. 
CAR 
Cumulative Abnormal Return of firms using market model with value-weighted 
return of firms listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) measured over five 
days, i.e., three days prior to the event day to one day after the event day. 
Cash  The ratio of cash and cash equivalent to current liabilities. 
Corp_Gov  
An index computed using disclosures made under the corporate governance code 
(Clause 49) issued by Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI), and consistent 
with Hawas and Tse (2016). 
Book_Tax_Diff  Book-tax income spread computed as per Manzon and Plesko (2002). 
TAX_AGGRESSIVE 3-year average of disputed sales tax contingent liability scaled by 3-year average of total revenue. 
Escrow Statutory deposits with taxing authorities pending appeals, deflated by total assets. 
STATE_GOV  A dummy that takes a value of 1 if the firm is registered in a state that has been ranked in the top quartile for ease of doing business by World Bank, 0 otherwise. 
Lev The ratio of debt to total assets. 
MCAP Natural log of market capitalization of the firm.  
Int_Ops Earnings derived from overseas operations as a proportion of total earnings. 
PB Price to book ratio. 
Pre_Ret Market adjusted return of the previous year. 
Prod_Diversity A dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the firm has more product segments than the Industry median, 0 otherwise. 
Prom_Hold  Percentage of shares held by promoters (controlling shareholders). 
Proximity_HQ Proportion of plants located in the same state same as the head office location. 
R&D Research and development expenses deflated by total assets. 
ROE The ratio of earnings after tax to net worth. 
TA Natural log of total assets.  
Tangibility Tangible fixed assets as a proportion of total fixed assets. 
Tax_Advice A dummy variable that takes value of 1 if external auditor provides tax related services, 0 otherwise. 
Z-Score Altman Z-score computed using Altman (2005) model. 
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Figure 1 Regression Discontinuity Plots 
 
Panel A: Abnormal returns centered median disputed sales tax contingent liability 
 
 
 
Panel B: Pseudo Event Date 1 Panel C: Pseudo Event Date 2 Panel D: Pseudo Event Date 3 
   
 
Notes. The above figures display the functional form and fitted regression curves of firm-level 
abnormal returns (CAR) around the average value of TAX_AGGRESSIVE, the 3-year average of 
disputed sales tax contingent liabilities scaled by 3-year average of total revenue. The x-axis is 
the value of TAX_AGGRESSIVE. The vertical line represents the cutoff/threshold of median 
value of TAX_AGGRESSIVE (0.004213). Each dot depicts a local sample mean using forty non-
overlapping, evenly spaced bins with bin widths of 2.5%. The solid lines represent the fitted 
quadratic polynomial function to the left and right of the TAX_AGGRESSIVE threshold. Panels 
A, B, C, and D present the results for three randomly chosen pseudo-event dates, respectively. 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics for Propensity to Engage in Indirect Tax Aggressiveness 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics of variables. TAX_AGGRESSIVE is computed as disputed sales tax 
liability scaled by total revenue. Prod_Diversity is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the firm has 
product segments more than Industry median, 0 otherwise. Proximity_HQ is Proportion of plant located 
in the state same as that of head office location state. Int_Ops is foreign earnings as a proportion of total 
earnings. Book_Tax_Diff is Book-tax difference computed as per Manzon and Plesko (2002). 
Tax_Advice is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if external auditor provides tax related 
services, 0 otherwise. Prom_Hold is percentage of shares held by the promoters. BG is dummy variable 
coded as 1 if the firm is affiliated to business group, 0 otherwise. Z score is Altman Z score computed 
using Altman (2005) model. Corp_Gov is a governance index computed using corporate governance code 
(Clause 49) issued by Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI). Tangibility is ratio of tangible fixed 
assets as a proportion of total fixed assets. R & D is Research and development expenses as a proportion 
to total assets. Escrow is a variable that controls for the statutory deposits with the government 
authorities. Lev is financial leverage, defined as the ratio of debt to total assets. MCAP is market 
capitalization of the firm. PB is market price-to-book ratio. ROE is return on equity calculated as earnings 
after tax divided by net worth. BIG4 is a dummy variable coded as 1 if a firm is audited by any of the big-
4 auditor or its affiliate. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix I. 
 
 Variable N Mean p25 Median p75 
TAX_AGGRESSIVE 16,798 0.0038 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Prod_Diversity 16,798 0.5927    
Proximity_HQ 16,798 0.4778 0.0000 0.4444 1.0000 
Int_Ops 16,798 0.1846 0.0000 0.0507 0.2758 
Book_Tax_Diff 16,798 0.0114 -0.0024 0.0005 0.0190 
Tax_Advice 16,798 0.1660    
Prom_Hold 16,798 0.5235 0.4197 0.5349 0.6516 
BG 16,798 0.4287    
Z-Score 16,798 5.5027 4.4365 5.5405 6.7512 
Corp_Gov 16,798 0.7546 0.6667 0.7778 0.8750 
Tangibility 16,798 0.3050 0.1527 0.2875 0.4364 
R&D 16,798 0.0017 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004 
ESCROW 16,798 0.0077 0.0000 0.0007 0.0096 
Lev 16,798 0.3016 0.1489 0.2964 0.4335 
PB 16798 2.0142 0.5300 1.0100 2.1000 
MCAP 16,798 6.9043 5.3135 6.6979 8.2554 
ROE 16,798 0.1120 0.0186 0.0957 0.2064 
BIG4 16,792 0.1524    
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Table 2 Correlations 
 
This table reports correlations of variables. TAX_AGGRESSIVE is computed as disputed sales tax liability scaled by total revenue. Prod_Diversity 
is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the firm has product segments more than Industry median, 0 otherwise. Proximity_HQ is Proportion of 
plant located in the state same as that of head office location state. Int_Ops is foreign earnings as a proportion of total earnings. Book_Tax_Diff is 
Book-tax difference computed as per Manzon and Plesko (2002). Tax_Advice is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if external auditor 
provides tax related services, 0 otherwise. Prom_Hold is percentage of shares held by the promoters. BG is dummy variable coded as 1 if the 
firm is affiliated to business group, 0 otherwise. Z score is Altman Z score computed using Altman (2005) model. Corp_Gov is a governance 
index computed using corporate governance code (Clause 49) issued by Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI). Tangibility is ratio of tangible 
fixed assets as a proportion of total fixed assets. R & D is Research and development expenses as a proportion to total assets. Escrow is a variable 
that controls for the statutory deposits with the government authorities. Lev is financial leverage, defined as the ratio of debt to total assets. MCAP 
is market capitalization of the firm. PB is market price-to-book ratio. ROE is return on equity calculated as earnings after tax divided by net worth. 
BIG4 is a dummy variable coded as 1 if a firm is audited by any of the big-4 auditor or its affiliate. Detailed variable definitions are provided in 
Appendix I. * denotes significance at the 5% level. 
 
    [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] 
[1] TAX_AGGRESSIVE 1                                 
[2] Prod_Diversity 0.0169* 1                               
[3] Proximity_HQ 0.0203* -0.0010 1                             
[4] Int_Ops -0.0368* -0.0148 0.0883* 1                           
[5] Book_Tax_Diff -0.0059 0.0019 -0.0464* 0.1008* 1                         
[6] Tax_Advice 0.0121 -0.0001 0.0006 0.0599* 0.0091 1                       
[7] Prom_Hold 0.0117 -0.0320* -0.0054 -0.0377* 0.0391* 0.0201* 1                     
[8] BG 0.0213* -0.0126 -0.0414* -0.0557* 0.0397* 0.0671* 0.0826* 1                   
[9] Z-Score -0.0646* -0.0055 -0.0232* 0.1289* 0.3138* 0.0007 0.0552* -0.0990* 1                 
[10] Corp_Gov -0.0020 0.0144 -0.0125 -0.0289* -0.0341* -0.0580* -0.1003* -0.0557* -0.0202* 1               
[11] Tangibility -0.0254* 0.0026 0.1447* -0.0389* -0.0630* -0.0007 0.0589* 0.0477* -0.2249* -0.0883* 1             
[12] R&D -0.0103 -0.0031 -0.0016 0.0929* 0.1014* 0.0529* 0.0069 0.0893* 0.0654* -0.0549* 0.0082 1           
[13] ESCROW 0.0085 -0.0007 0.0586* -0.0007 -0.0367* 0.0158* 0.0825* 0.0283* -0.0460* -0.0252* 0.0480* 0.0502* 1         
[14] Lev -0.0055 -0.0224* 0.0813* -0.0018 -0.1506* -0.002 0.0124 0.0063 -0.2724* -0.0313* 0.2776* -0.1140* 0.0429* 1       
[15] MCAP -0.0035 0.0015 -0.0682* -0.0321* 0.1070* 0.0093 0.1111* 0.0847* -0.0309* 0.0095 -0.0414* 0.1058* -0.0101 -0.0319* 1     
[16] PB -0.0163* -0.0027 -0.1982* 0.0343* 0.2128* 0.1409* 0.1265* 0.3877* 0.1022* -0.1142* -0.0763* 0.1948* 0.0074 -0.0915* 0.3646* 1   
[17] ROE -0.0289* 0.0039 -0.0421* 0.0311* 0.4207* 0.0144 0.0827* 0.0304* 0.3747* -0.0352* -0.0875* 0.0803* 0.0006 -0.2016* 0.1072* 0.2324* 1 
[18] BIG4 0.0039 0.0288* -0.0959* 0.0230* 0.0651* -0.0159* 0.0898* 0.2143* 0.0298* -0.0339* -0.0517* 0.1365* 0.0322* -0.1763* 0.1634* 0.4000* 0.0701* 
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Table 3 Test of Incentives to Engage in Indirect Tax Aggressiveness 
 
This table reports regression coefficients (p-values in parenthesis). TAX_AGGRESSIVE is computed as 
disputed sales tax liability scaled by total revenue. Prod_Diversity is a dummy variable that takes value of 
1 if the firm has product segments more than Industry median, 0 otherwise. Proximity_HQ is Proportion 
of plant located in the state same as that of head office location state. Int_Ops is foreign earnings as a 
proportion of total earnings. Book_Tax_Diff is Book-tax difference computed as per Manzon-Plesko 
(2002). Tax_Advice is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if external auditor provides tax 
related services, 0 otherwise. Prom_Hold is percentage of shares held by the promoters. BG is dummy 
variable coded as 1 if the firm is affiliated to business group, 0 otherwise. Z score is Altman Z score 
computed using Altman (2005) model. Corp_Gov is a governance index computed using corporate 
governance code (Clause 49) issued by Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI). Tangibility is ratio of 
tangible fixed assets as a proportion of total fixed assets. R & D is Research and development expenses as 
a proportion to total assets. Escrow is a variable that controls for the statutory deposits with the 
government authorities. Lev is financial leverage, defined as the ratio of debt to total assets. MCAP is 
market capitalization of the firm. PB is market price-to-book ratio. ROE is return on equity calculated as 
earnings after tax divided by net worth. BIG4 is a dummy variable coded as 1 if a firm is audited by any 
of the big-4 auditor or its affiliate. Detailed variable definitions are provided in Appendix I.   ***, ** and 
* denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Standard errors are corrected based on two-
way clustering by firm (Petersen, 2009). 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  TAX_AGGRESSIVE TAX_AGGRESSIVE TAX_AGGRESSIVE TAX_AGGRESSIVE 
Prod_Diversity 0.0015**     0.0015** 
  (0.023)     (0.021) 
Proximity_HQ 0.0033***     0.0031** 
  (0.009)     (0.011) 
Int_Ops -0.0050***     -0.0044*** 
  (0.003)     (0.003) 
Book_Tax_Diff   0.0116*   0.0201** 
    (0.092)   (0.024) 
Tax_Advice   0.0012   0.0013* 
    (0.127)   (0.093) 
Prom_Hold     0.0035* 0.0047** 
      (0.054) (0.027) 
BG     0.0021** 0.0013* 
      (0.010) (0.089) 
Z-Score       -0.0012** 
        (0.010) 
Corp_Gov -0.0046 -0.0043 -0.0041 -0.0041 
  (0.113) (0.131) (0.138) (0.145) 
Tangibility -0.0054** -0.0047* -0.0051* -0.0082** 
  (0.049) (0.071) (0.055) (0.016) 
R&D -0.0193 -0.0473 -0.0439 -0.0241 
  (0.689) (0.303) (0.351) (0.631) 
	 46 
ESCROW 0.0128 0.0098 0.0064 0.0056 
  (0.515) (0.625) (0.748) (0.780) 
Lev 0.0024 0.0022 0.0019 0.0000 
  (0.551) (0.585) (0.627) (0.988) 
PB 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 
  (0.641) (0.357) (0.343) (0.490) 
MCAP -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0007* -0.0005 
  (0.278) (0.103) (0.052) (0.108) 
ROE -0.0018** -0.0027*** -0.0019** -0.0010 
  (0.034) (0.002) (0.028) (0.160) 
BIG4 0.0008 0.0009 0.0005 0.0005 
  (0.469) (0.387) (0.658) (0.649) 
Intercept 0.0039 0.0070** 0.0055* 0.0096** 
  (0.188) (0.046) (0.085) (0.020) 
N 16,792 16,792 16,792 16,792 
R-sq 0.056 0.054 0.055 0.060 
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Table 4 Descriptive Statistics of the Sample for Market Reaction Analysis 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics of variables. CAR represents firm level cumulative 
abnormal return using market model with value-weighted return of firms listed on the BSE 
during 5 days, i.e., 3 days prior to event day to one day post event day. ROE is return on equity 
calculated as earnings after tax to net worth. TAX_AGGRESSIVE is computed as disputed sales 
tax liability scaled by total revenue. Cash is the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to the current 
liabilities. STATE_GOV is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the firm is registered in a state that 
has been ranked in the top quartile for ease of doing business by World Bank. Pre_Ret is a 
market adjusted return of the previous year. Escrow is a variable that controls for the statutory 
deposits with the government authorities. Segment is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if 
the firm operates in multiple product segments, and 0 otherwise 
 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. p25 Median p75 
CAR 2,685 -0.0120 0.0658 -0.0469 -0.0132 0.0120 
ROE 2,685 -0.0122 0.3739 -0.0013 0.0357 0.1137 
MCAP 2,685 6.1092 2.9162 4.3663 6.0549 7.9958 
Ease of Doing Business – 
State Level Rank 2,386 8.7016 4.4697 8.0000 8.0000 12.0000 
TAX_AGGRESSIVE 2,685 0.0084 0.1028 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 
Cash 2,685 2.5363 8.5601 0.4289 0.7565 1.3548 
STATE_GOV 2,685 0.1970 0.3978 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pre_Ret 2,685 0.0988 0.2915 -0.0279 0.0284 0.2425 
Escrow 2,685 0.0088 0.0177 0.0000 0.0003 0.0100 
Segment 2,685 0.2313 0.4217 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
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Table 5 Pearson Correlations 
 
This table reports Pearson correlations. CAR represents Cumulative Abnormal Return of firms (using market model with value-
weighted return of firms listed on the BSE) during 5 days i.e. 3 days prior to event day to 1-day post event day. ROE is return on 
equity calculated as earnings after tax to net worth. MCAP is market capitalization of the firm. TAX_AGGRESSIVE is computed as 
disputed sales tax liability scaled by total revenue. Cash is the ratio of cash and cash equivalent to the current liabilities. STATE_GOV 
is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the firm is registered in a state that has been ranked in the top quartile for ease of doing business 
by World Bank. Pre_Ret is a market adjusted return of the previous year. Escrow is a variable that controls for the statutory deposits 
with the government authorities scaled by firm size. Segment is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the firm operates in multiple 
product segments, and 0 otherwise. * denotes significance at 10% level. 
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ROE 0.028        
MCAP -0.062* 0.101*       
TAX_AGGRESSIVE -0.035* -0.132* -0.030      
Cash 0.043* -0.003 -0.139* -0.013     
STATE_GOV 0.063* 0.001 -0.080* 0.035* 0.014    
Pre_Ret -0.055* 0.050* 0.096* 0.001 -0.083* -0.011   
Escrow 0.011 0.035* 0.087* -0.009 -0.084* 0.013 0.047*  
Segment -0.030 0.027 0.151* -0.012 -0.055* -0.039* 0.047* 0.027 
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Table 6 Cross Sectional Tests of the Firm-Level Stock Price Reaction 
 
This table reports regression coefficients (p-value in parenthesis). CAR represents Cumulative 
Abnormal Return of firms (using market model with value-weighted return of firms listed on the 
BSE) during 5 days, i.e., 3 days prior to event day to 1-day post event day. TAX_AGGRESSIVE 
is computed as disputed sales tax liability scaled by total revenue. Cash is the ratio of cash and 
cash equivalent to the current liabilities. STATE_GOV is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if the 
firm is registered in a state that has been ranked in the top quartile for ease of doing business by 
World Bank. Pre_Ret is a market adjusted return of the previous year. Escrow is a variable that 
controls for the statutory deposits with the government authorities. Segment is a dummy variable 
that takes value of 1 if the firm operates in multiple product segments, and 0 otherwise. ROE is 
return on equity calculated as earnings after tax to net worth. MCAP is market capitalization of 
the firm. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) 
 CAR 
TAX_AGGRESSIVE -0.0196*** 
 (0.001) 
Cash 0.0002*** 
 (0.008) 
STATE_GOV 0.0090** 
 (0.012) 
Pre_Ret -0.0111** 
 (0.030) 
Escrow 0.0619 
 (0.411) 
Segment -0.0029 
 (0.433) 
ROE 0.0061 
 (0.106) 
MCAP -0.0011** 
 (0.026) 
Intercept -0.0057 
 (0.213) 
N 2,685 
R-sq 0.013 
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Tables 7 Robustness Analysis – Two-Stage Selection Model 
 
This table reports regression coefficients (p-value in parenthesis). CAR represents Cumulative 
Abnormal Return of firms (using market model with value-weighted return of firms listed on the 
BSE) during 5 days, i.e., 3 days prior to event day to 1-day post event day. 
TAX_AGGRESSIVE_dummy is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the firm has disputed 
tax liability that is more than average of all the firm in the respective year, 0 otherwise 
Prod_Diversity is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 if the firm has product segments more than 
Industry median, 0 otherwise. Proximity_HQ is Proportion of plant located in the state same as that of 
head office location state. Int_Ops is foreign earnings as a proportion of total earnings. Book_Tax_Diff is 
Book-tax difference computed as per Manzon-Plesko (2002). Tax_Advice is a dummy variable that 
takes value of 1 if external auditor provides tax related services, 0 otherwise. Prom_Hold is 
percentage of shares held by the promoters. BG is dummy variable coded as 1 if the firm is affiliated to 
business group, 0 otherwise. Z score is Altman Z score computed using Altman (2005) model. Corp_Gov 
is a governance index computed using corporate governance code (Clause 49) issued by Securities 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI). Tangibility is ratio of tangible fixed assets as a proportion of total fixed 
assets. R & D is Research and development expenses as a proportion to total assets. Escrow is a variable 
that controls for the statutory deposits with the government authorities. Lev is financial leverage, defined 
as the ratio of debt to total assets. MCAP is market capitalization of the firm. PB is market price-to-book 
ratio. ROE is return on equity calculated as earnings after tax divided by net worth. BIG4 is a dummy 
variable coded as 1 if a firm is audited by any of the big-4 auditor or its affiliate. Detailed variable 
definitions are provided in Appendix I.  ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A First Stage – Determinants of Indirect Tax Aggressiveness 
 
First Stage 
  TAX_AGGRESSIVE_dummy 
    
Prod_Diversity 0.145* 
  (0.062) 
Proximity_HQ 0.291*** 
  (0.002) 
Int_Ops -0.885*** 
  (0.000) 
Book_Tax_Diff 1.286** 
  (0.048) 
Tax_Advice 0.186** 
  (0.044) 
Prom_Hold 0.409* 
  (0.084) 
BG 0.108 
  (0.180) 
Z-Score -0.0712*** 
  (0.000) 
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Corp_Gov -0.543* 
  (0.068) 
Tangibility -0.838*** 
  (0.000) 
R&D -19.65* 
  (0.051) 
ESCROW 2.055 
  (0.367) 
Lev -0.112 
  (0.604) 
PB 0.0203** 
  (0.035) 
MCAP -0.0665*** 
  (0.006) 
ROE -0.258*** 
  (0.009) 
BIG4 0.369*** 
  (0.000) 
Intercept  -0.579 
  (0.154) 
N 12,066 
R-sq 0.208 
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Panel B Second Stage – Market Reaction around the Passage of the GST Bill 
 
 
Basic 
Model 
Second 
Stage 
  (1) (2) 
  CAR CAR 
      
TAX_AGGRESSIVE_dummy -0.0058** -0.0057*** 
  (0.012) (0.010) 
Cash 0.0002** 0.0002** 
  (0.013) (0.021) 
STATE_GOV 0.0092*** 0.0093*** 
  (0.009) (0.009) 
Pre_Ret -0.0109** -0.0108** 
  (0.030) (0.031) 
Escrow 0.0751 0.0774 
  (0.321) (0.309) 
Segment -0.0024 -0.0023 
  (0.525) (0.554) 
ROE 0.0062 0.0062* 
  (0.102) (0.092) 
MCAP -0.0009* -0.0009 
  (0.072) (0.111) 
Lambda  -0.0003 
   (0.792) 
Intercept -0.0060 -0.0059 
  (0.180) (0.185) 
N 2,685 2,685 
R-sq 0.014 0.014 
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Tables 8 Robustness Analysis – Regression Discontinuity Design 
 
This table reports the treatment effect of TAX_AGGRESSIVE on firm-level abnormal returns 
centered on the passage of the GST Bill. Panel A presents differences in pre-treatment firm-level 
characteristics around the median value of TAX_AGGRESSIVE threshold, i.e., the median value 
of average disputed sales tax contingent liabilities deflated by total revenues. Thus, firms with 
non-zero values of TAX_AGGRESSIVE are divided into two partitions, firms that have value of 
TAX_AGGRESSIVE less than or equal to the sample median, and firms that have value of 
TAX_AGGRESSIVE greater than the sample median. Panel B presents the RD test results after 
controlling for covariates in Panel A. In Panel B, the optimal bandwidths defined in Imbens and 
Kalyanaraman (2012) are used for estimation. Z-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, **, 
and * represent two-tailed p-value significance levels of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.1 respectively. All 
variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
Panel A Comparison between full sample and the sub-sample containing firms with 
disputed sales tax contingent liabilities 
 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. p25 Median p75 
Total Assets (Full Sample) 
     
2,685  
      
17,035.1  
  
102,739.2  
     
323.4  
  
1,486.4  
    
6,831.6  
Total Assets (Disputed Sales Tax 
Contingent Liability Sample) 
          
710  
        
29,713.1  
      
98,975.6  
    
1,423.5  
    
5,122.3  
    
18,626.5  
Disputed Sales Tax Contingent 
Liabilities/Total Revenue 
          
710  0.0318 0.1982 0.0014 0.0042 0.0125 
 
Panel B Descriptive statistics for regression discontinuity sub-sample 
 
  < Threshold > Threshold 
p-value for 
Test of Diff 
TAX_AGGRESSIVE 0.0027 0.0077 0.000 
Total Assets (INR Million) 7074.7 6481.1 0.396 
Cash 1.33 1.02 0.441 
STATE_GOV 0.19 0.22 0.721 
Pre_Ret 0.1127 0.1966 0.051 
Escrow 0.01 0.01 0.478 
Segment 0.28 0.42 0.049 
ROE 0.04 -0.01 0.327 
MCAP 7.42 7.52 0.787 
N 98 71  
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Panel C Regression discontinuity test 
 
  CAR 
TAX_AGGRESSIVE -0.0461 *** 
  (0.006)   
Controls  Yes  
Observations 169   
Kernel Triangular   
 
